


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CTA/SAVA /WVIND 700404



## WEEKLY VIETNAM INDICATORS

*Week Ending 4 April 1970*

**NSA Declassification/Release Instructions on File.**

*For the President Only*







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## SOUTH VIETNAM WEEKLY INDICATORS







1968-1970

Weekly average  
for each month

1968 — 1969 — 1970

Dotted line shows current  
average for April 1970

OCTOBER 1969-APRIL 1970

Weekly data as reported, Feb-Mar-Apr  
Weekly average per month, Oct-Jan**US BATTLE DEATHS** rose sharply to 142 from last week's 79.**SOUTH VIETNAMESE BATTLE DEATHS** jumped to 515 from last week's low 180. The official total will change as late reports are received and will be lower than figures released to the press by the GVN.**INFILTRATORS DETECTED IN PIPELINE** numbered six four-digit groups, plus one "gap fill" group for a total of over 3,200 infiltrators. The total since 23 October is now some 56,000 to 57,500.**ENEMY-INITIATED INCIDENTS** increased to 785 from last week's 537.**ENEMY KILLED IN ACTION** reflected the increase in tactical activity, climbing to 3,336 from last week's 2,133.**SOUTH VIETNAMESE EFFECTIVENESS** as measured by the percentage of enemy killed by RVN forces increased markedly to 64%.

Statistics for the latest week shown are preliminary

FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY

Enemy Activity

On the night of 31 March - 1 April, the Communists launched their anticipated "high point" with numerous but generally light attacks by fire and scattered ground clashes in all Corps' areas. While the evidence had suggested that the "high point" would be less than a country-wide effort, Hanoi may have decided that a larger show of force would back up its tough stance on Cambodia and relieve pressure on border sanctuaries by dampening Saigon's ardor for cross-border attacks. The level of activity decreased after the initial surge, but it has remained higher than any enemy activity level during the preceeding several months. This much-delayed enemy offensive phase, originally scheduled for February, had been frustrated until now both by Allied pre-emptive operations and internal problems within the Communist organization. It appears that the higher level of activity will continue for a time, since available evidence points to a second round of attacks and to an increased threat to Allied outposts in the Western Highlands.

Enemy Infiltration

During the week, six battalion-size groups were detected in North Vietnam and one was accepted as a "gap fill," with a combined strength of 3,246. This raises the total estimate of infiltrators entering the pipeline since 23 October 1969 to some 56,000 to 57,500. Infiltration for the first quarter of 1970 now stands at an estimated 37,000 compared to the 62,000 for the same period in 1969.

The fourth and probably final stage of the current crash logistics program in Laos is expected to terminate about the end of April. The earlier stages appear to have been quite successful as the Communists have moved large volumes of materiel southward.

South Vietnam Developments

The Saigon scene has been characterized this past week by considerable political ferment. The most serious of several currents of dissidence is unrest among the students who have been provoked by the arrest of forty students last month. Although the government has a solid case of collaboration with the VC against most of those arrested, it has not moved deftly, or quickly enough, to present its case to the students, teachers, intellectuals, and to the press. The political pot is also being stirred by disabled veterans who have been building shacks along the main Saigon streets in order to dramatize their complaint over the government's failure to provide adequate housing. Several other unresolved problems are contributing to a general sense of uneasiness, including the unplaced complaints of the Khmer Buddhists, the politically embarrassing adverse Supreme Court ruling on the constitutionality of the Chau case, and the 30 percent inflationary rise in prices since last October. Several Vietnamese officers have asserted that the high cost of food is having a serious effect on troop morale and is causing a lack of aggressiveness, fatigue, high desertion rates, and a general lessening of patriotic fervor. President Thieu, who has roundly criticized his ministers for their inept handling of the problems, is reported to be actively considering an overhaul of his cabinet in an effort to deflect criticism from himself and defuse the situation. Meanwhile, the opposition will no doubt try to keep the pot boiling until after the Senate elections in August.

Communist Developments

The Vietnamese Communists have not yet reacted to the French proposal for a new conference on Indo China. Their spokesmen at Paris turned the issue aside last Thursday by referring to previous positions taken on a settlement. The North Vietnamese briefer refused comment except to state that Hanoi still supported General De Gaulle's 1966 call for a neutral Indo China. The PRG representative said his government stands behind the Viet Cong's ten points, the Pathet Lao's five points, and Prince Sihanouk's 23 March statement. There is at present no indication that the Communists see an advantage to bringing diplomacy to bear in the Vietnam situation, and they are probably leery of another Geneva-type conference where their interests, as in 1954, could be subordinated to those of the big-powers. The discord in the Sino-Soviet camp would be a further deterrent. Peking and Moscow have been officially silent on the French proposal, although a Soviet spokesman has termed it "interesting."

~~Top Secret~~